Before sending a sensitive file, check the state of the particular conversation, not just the messenger’s name. An app may end-to-end encrypt private-chat attachments while drawing a different boundary for public channels, enterprise file storage, or backups.
This comparison relies on official documentation reviewed on 24 October 2026; it is not an independent test of every version or a ranking of overall product security. Here, an attachment means a file or media item sent in a conversation, not every file stored across all product features.
Comparing file coverage in 10 services
| Service | Documented scope of protection | Exception or point to check |
|---|---|---|
| Livara | Files and media in direct messages and groups protected by LVR1/LGS1 | Public channels; incompatible group state; recipient devices |
| Signal | Signal conversations are end-to-end encrypted | Files saved or exported outside the app have a separate boundary |
| Personal messages and content sent in protected conversations | Backup protection settings and sharing with recipients or businesses | |
| Messenger | Media in conversations with E2EE | The state of that chat and feature; do not assume every product surface is the same |
| Telegram | Files in two-person Secret Chats | Cloud Chats and groups are not E2EE; Secret Chats are tied to the originating device |
| iMessage | iMessage messages and media | SMS/MMS differ; RCS status depends on encryption support |
| Element/Matrix | Attachments in encrypted rooms | Check room settings, devices, and integrations |
| Wire | Files sent in Wire communications with E2EE | Wire Drive is an exception: files and folders are encrypted in transit and at rest, not under the same E2EE claim |
| Threema | Messages, groups, and media files with E2EE | Examine exported files and backups separately |
| Session | Private messages and private groups with E2EE | A Community does not have the same boundary as a private group |
This table does not establish that these services have equivalent algorithms, metadata practices, or implementation quality. Check each row’s claim for the version and conversation type you use.
Consider photos, captions, and previews separately
In a typical design, a file is encrypted with a separate content key and uploaded; the key and download address reach the recipient in a protected message. Captions, filenames, and thumbnails are data too, and their protection scope must be clear.
Displaying a photo and caption together in the interface does not prove that they have identical coverage. After download, saving to the gallery or sending to another app may also create a copy outside the messenger’s boundary. Encryption in transit does not determine the policy for all those copies.
Livara’s declared position
Livara’s security page describes a separate random key for each attachment and transferring that key within a protected session; captions, filenames, and attachment keys are included in the scope of protected group content. The same page explicitly states that operational metadata remains on the server and that incompatible legacy groups must be clearly identified as outside E2EE.
This description is not a guarantee of every device’s security or an independent audit of the app. In the threat model, an infected device and a recipient who discloses content fall outside the protection of encryption along the communication path.
Three common pitfalls when comparing attachments
A voice message is not a live call
A recorded voice message is a file. Live calls depend on the media protocol and call architecture. Audio-file encryption does not support conclusions about server-side recording or protection of all calls.
Multiple devices do not imply plaintext on the server
A service can distribute keys or protected messages to authorized devices. But each device allowed to decrypt is another access point to the content. Device lists, verification of new devices, and revoking old devices’ access matter.
A “green message” does not always mean one fixed state
Apple now describes E2EE-enabled RCS with iOS 26.5 and supporting carriers; all participants must support it. SMS and MMS still do not have the same protection. Pay attention to the indicator and actual conversation type, not just the interface color.
Before sending a confidential document
- Verify the recipient and conversation type; do not confuse a channel or Community with a private group.
- Check E2EE status and authorized devices.
- Establish policies for automatic saving, downloads, and backups.
- If the file itself contains sensitive metadata, inspect it before sending; E2EE does not hide it from the recipient.
- Tell the recipient what use or resharing is permitted; encryption does not replace a confidentiality agreement.
