LIVARA 0.9.16 / RUNS ON YOUR DEVICE

Run the checksyourself.

Five working instruments, not a badge in a footer. Hash the Android build against the digest published here, generate real keys, seal a message and then break it. Everything runs in this tab; the page has no upload endpoint to send anything to.

Your verification score

0% verified

0 of 5 checks completed on this device.

The APK you downloaded is the APK we publishedHash your own file in your own browser and compare it to the number below.
The shipped cryptographic primitives really produce ciphertextRun real P-256, HKDF and AES-GCM locally; the full LVR1/LGS1 composition remains outside this bench.
A tampered message is rejected, not silently acceptedFlip one bit of the ciphertext and watch the authentication check refuse it.
You can tell one key from anotherGenerate two identities and see that no two fingerprints collide.
None of this needed our serversEverything on this page runs offline. Disconnect and try it again.
INSTRUMENT 01 — BUILD IDENTITY
Instrument 01

Is this file ours?

An APK is just bytes, and bytes can be swapped anywhere between our server and your phone — a hostile network, a mirror, a helpful friend with a modified build. There is exactly one way to know. Drop your download below: it is read in slices, hashed on this device, and never leaves it.

sha256.localnothing is uploaded
Waiting for a file.
published.digest0.9.16 (116)
916D12CC FDA7F4A8 EF95744A 6419AAB9 169FA5A0 74F977DB CB7C77A7 92C4C2AE
Raw .sha256

FILE — livara-chat-0.9.16-116.apk
SIZE — 198.2 MB
MINIMUM — Android 7.0+

Prefer your own tools? Run sha256sum on Linux, shasum -a 256 on macOS, or certutil -hashfile … SHA256 on Windows. You should not have to trust this page either.

INSTRUMENT 02 — THE SEALING
Instrument 02

Watch a message become unreadable

Two identities are generated in your browser the moment you press the button. They agree on a secret over P-256 ECDH without that secret ever existing on the wire, stretch it through HKDF-SHA-256, and seal your text with AES-256-GCM. What comes back is what a relay would actually be holding.

handshake.liveP-256 · HKDF · AES-256-GCM
Adaprivate key stays here
Boprivate key stays here
Not generated yet.
relay.storagewhat the server would hold
Press “Seal it” and this fills with the only version of your sentence a relay ever sees.
Nothing has been opened yet.

The honest footnote. This bench runs the P-256, HKDF and AES-GCM primitives for real. The shipped LVR1 protocol also advances classical message chains and a separate ML-KEM-768 epoch root; LGS1 adds signed group sender chains. No browser API exposes the complete construction, so this bench does not pretend to be a protocol audit.

INSTRUMENT 03 — IDENTITY
Instrument 03

Two keys should never look alike

A fingerprint is a short, readable stand-in for a public key. It is how you notice that the person you have been talking to for a year suddenly has a different one. Press it a few times.

identity.generateP-256 · SHA-256
Press more than once
INSTRUMENT 04 — SILENCE
Instrument 04

Confirm none of this phoned home

A privacy claim you cannot audit is a slogan. Your browser keeps its own record of every request a page makes. This lab snapshots that record when it opens and shows how many it has made since. The better test is to turn your network off and run everything above again.

network.auditbrowser resource timeline
0

After the checks

What this page cannot prove

A verification page that claims to settle everything is just a longer advertisement. Here is the exact edge of what you have established.

Established
  • The APK bytes you selected match the digest published on this site
  • The small browser demonstrations behave as displayed on your machine
  • A single altered bit is refused, not silently accepted
  • Distinct identities produce distinct, comparable fingerprints
  • None of these checks required our servers to be involved
Still open
  • That our server does not log who you message, and when — it does
  • That channel content or every control event is hidden from us — it is not
  • That LGS1 membership resists a compromised server — it does not
  • That this bench proves the complete LVR1 or LGS1 composition — it does not
  • That your own device is free of malware reading your screen
  • That a future release behaves like this one — check every build
  • That this page is honest, if you never verify anything on it
What the Livara server can and cannot read in direct chats, compatible encrypted groups, and channels
What it isDirect 1:1GroupsChannels
Message textSealed on your deviceLGS1 sender-key sealedServer can read it
Text editsSealed on your deviceLGS1 sender-key sealedServer can read them
Photos, video, files, captionsEncrypted before uploadEncrypted before uploadServer can read them
Who you talked toServer knowsServer knowsServer knows
When you talkedServer knowsServer knowsServer knows
Your passwordNever leaves your deviceNever leaves your deviceNever leaves your device
Your private keysNever leave your deviceNever leave your deviceNever leave your device
Questions

The ones people actually ask

How do I check that a Livara APK has not been tampered with?

Download the APK, then use the Proof Lab on this page to compute its SHA-256 digest in your own browser and compare it, character by character, to the digest published beside the download. The file is never uploaded — the hashing runs entirely on your device. If the two digests differ, the file is not the build published here and should be deleted rather than installed.

Does the Proof Lab send anything to Livara's servers?

No. Every instrument runs locally using primitives your browser already ships. The page counts its own network requests using the browser's resource timeline and shows you the number, so the claim can be checked rather than trusted. You can also disconnect from the network and run every instrument again.

Is the encryption demo the real Livara encryption?

It runs real P-256 ECDH, HKDF-SHA-256 and AES-256-GCM primitives used by Livara, but it is not the complete LVR1 or LGS1 protocol. LVR1 also has a classical double ratchet and an ML-KEM-768 epoch ratchet; LGS1 has signed sender chains distributed inside LVR1. This lab proves the local primitives and tamper rejection, not the whole composition or an external audit.

What happens if someone changes one byte of an encrypted message?

The AES-256-GCM authentication tag fails and the receiver rejects the message outright. It does not show a corrupted or partially decrypted version. You can trigger this yourself in the Proof Lab: seal a message, flip a single bit, and watch the decryption be refused.

Checked it? Then install it.

Not before. That order is the entire recommendation, and it applies to every app you install, not only this one.

Open LivaraGet the app