Telegram (Secret Chats)
Telegram offers end-to-end encryption exclusively through manual, device-bound "Secret Chats". Standard direct messages and all group chats remain unencrypted on their servers by default, leaving the burden of maintaining privacy entirely on the user.
Livara Chat
Livara deploys hybrid post-quantum end-to-end encryption (ML-KEM-768 and ECDH P-256) by default for all private direct messages (LVR1) and group chats (LGS1), structurally enforcing privacy without requiring any manual configuration.
Default encryption effortlessly defeats opt-in security. By forcing users to manually enable Secret Chats, Telegram creates an illusion of privacy that often fails in practice. Livara's verifiable post-quantum architecture ensures that every private conversation is securely sealed from the moment you press send, making it the superior framework for secure messenger daily use.
Default end-to-end encryption reduces the chance of sending a sensitive message in the wrong mode. It does not make every feature in an app private, eliminate metadata or protect a compromised phone.
A useful comparison asks two questions: What happens when I start an ordinary personal conversation? What changes when I use a group, backup, public channel or another device? This guide compares five messengers on those terms, using their published documentation checked on 24 October 2026. It is not an independent security ranking.
What “default” changes
With optional E2EE, users must choose a supported encrypted conversation before sending. If they choose another mode, that mode's rules apply. With default E2EE, supported personal conversations begin protected without a separate secrecy switch.
Neither choice tells you everything about the service. A provider can encrypt data on its servers without providing E2EE, and an E2EE messenger can still retain operational records. Encryption at rest, transport encryption and end-to-end encryption address different access paths.
Five products, five scopes to check
| Messenger | Documented starting point | Important boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Signal | Signal conversations use E2EE without an optional secret mode | Intended recipients and their devices can access the plaintext |
| Personal messages and calls use E2EE by default | Online backup protection is a separate setting and recovery system | |
| Telegram | Ordinary Cloud Chats use client-server encryption; Secret Chats add E2EE | Secret Chats are one-to-one and device-specific; ordinary groups are not E2EE |
| Messenger | Meta documents default E2EE for personal messages and calls | Check the actual conversation and feature rather than assuming all Facebook surfaces have the same protection |
| Livara | Published architecture describes protected direct chats and LGS1 private groups | Public channels are outside E2EE; an incompatible older group remains visibly outside it |
Sources: Signal privacy guidance, WhatsApp privacy, Telegram FAQ, Messenger's default-encryption announcement, and Livara security.
Why Telegram's two modes matter
Telegram's Cloud Chats support its cloud-history model. Secret Chats have a different confidentiality boundary and are tied to their originating devices. A normal group does not become a Secret Chat because its invitation link is private or its members trust one another.
For a conversation requiring E2EE, the practical issue is choosing a mode that provides it before sharing the content. Calling Cloud Chats “unencrypted” without qualification is also inaccurate: Telegram documents client-server encryption there. The distinction is who can decrypt, not whether any encryption exists.
Why WhatsApp's backup setting belongs in the comparison
A protected live message and a recoverable copy of its history are different objects. WhatsApp's privacy guidance explicitly offers encrypted online backups as an additional protection. Review that setting and its recovery method on your own account rather than inferring backup security from the lock on a conversation.
The same question belongs in every product evaluation: what is backed up, where is the decryption secret held and what happens if it is lost? A convenient account reset does not necessarily restore encrypted history.
Livara's stated protection and limits
Livara describes LVR1 direct sessions using classical and ML-KEM-768 material, and LGS1 sender-key encryption for protected groups. These are product architecture claims, not proof of an independently audited implementation.
Its documentation also records routing and membership metadata, separates public channels from private conversations and says v7 recovery restores cryptographic identity rather than chat history. A missing encryption identity stops a protected send; incompatible groups must not silently inherit the stronger label.
These qualifications are useful when testing a product. A named algorithm cannot tell you whether the conversation you have open is in the protected mode. Read the threat model alongside the feature description.
A practical default-encryption check
Before moving sensitive conversations:
- Start a test direct chat and a test group with the actual devices your participants use.
- Locate the encryption status and the supported identity-verification method.
- Check what happens when a member's device or identity changes. Do not dismiss an unexpected warning without confirming it.
- Review linked devices, history transfer and backups separately.
- Identify public surfaces, bots, exports and other ways content can leave the conversation.
Default encryption is a valuable usability property. The useful next step is verifying its scope, not treating “default” as a substitute for a threat model.
